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CARRIERs-GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL-DEFENSE TO ACTION FOR INJURIES

LIVE STOCK.-An express company as a common carrier under governmental
control accepted horses for transportation. Held: The fact of governmental
control of it and other carriers, on account of war, is not a defense to the consignee's suit for loss and depreciation of the shipment, caused by severe weather
and delay in delivery. Clapp v. American Express Co., 125 N. E. 162 (Mass.
TO

1919).

It has been held that military control of a railroad was no excuse for delay,
when the road was still operated by the employees of the company and the
government had in no way prevented the company from performing its contract
in the usual time. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. McClellan, 54 I1.
58 (1870). Military control of a road is no defense for delay where the government, through the military, required a railroad company to give preference
to government freights, and so exercised the right of determining for what persons shipments should be made, but did not control the movement of trains.
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Cobb, Christy & Co., 64 Ill. 128 (1872).
It has been held that orders proceeding from military authorities furnish an
excuse to the extent that the delay is made necessary thereby, Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. McClellan, supra; unless the condition was known at the time
of acceptance. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Cobb, supra. Where the fault
of the carrier is the cause of the interruption of the transit by the authorities,
it has no defense. Dunn v. Bucknall Bros., 2 K. B. 614 (1902), (carriage by
shipowners of goods destined for an alien enemy).
Military control would justify the carrier in refusing goods for carriage.
Illinois Railroad v. Ashmead, 58 Ill. 487 (1871); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Cobb, Christy & Co., supra; Same v. Hornberger, 77 Ill. 457 (1875); Phelps v.
Railroad Co., 94 Ill. 548 (188o). Although the carrier under this circumstance
may refuse to accept the goods, if it takes them into possession for the purpose
of carriage, it will be considered as waiving this right and consenting to accept
the goods upon the usual terms as to liability. Porcher v. Northeastern Railroad Co., 14 Rich. (Law) 181 (1867); Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 12 Wall.
(U. S.) 262 (1870). The principal case is in accord with the general authority.
CARRIERS-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-EMBEZZLEMENT BY EMPLOYE.-

Plaintiff in an interstate shipment of jewelry stated its value as $ioo, whereas
it was actually worth $375. The package was stolen by an employee of the
defendant carrier. Held: Plaintiff's recovery is limited to the valuation declared at the time of shipment. Henderson v. Wells Fargo Co., 217 S. W. 916
(Tex. 1920).
Prior to the passage of the so-called Carmack Amendment and the decision in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1912), the conflict
in views as to the extent of the right of a carrier to limit its liability in interstate
shipments was due to the fact that the State Courts applied their own particular
rules. However, since the decision in the Croninger case supra, the State Courts
are bound by the Federal rules of liability. See note in 66 U. of P. Law Rev. 167.
(392)
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No case similar on its facts to the principal case has been decided by the
Supreme Court, but the doctrine that a common carrier may limit its liability
even where there has been a wilful conversion by its servant is sustained by the
reasoning in the case of Georgia, etc. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S.
I9o (1916), to the effect that discriminations and rebates are forbidden, and
that therefore a carrier may lawfully pay claims only to the extent that it is
legally liable under the principles of the Supreme Court's decisions. In the
principal case, the plaintiff having paid a certain rate to cover a loss of $ioo,
to allow him to recover more would amount to a rebate.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMMERcE

CLAUSE-VALIDITY

OF STATE REGU-

LATION OF SALE PRICE OF NATURAL GAS IN INTERSTATE COMMERcE.-The

New York Public Service Commission, acting under the authority of a New
York Statute, regulated the rates at which natural gas should be furnished in
a New York city by the plaintlff gas company, a Pennsylvania corporation
engaged in the transportation of gas by pipe lines fifty miles in length from
its source of supply in Pennsylvania into New York, where it sold and delivered
the gas to consumers. Held: The action of the New York commission was
valid and did not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Pennsylvania Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, Second District,
New York,-U. S.-(Opinion by Mr. Justice Day, March I, 1920).
The interstate transportation and subsequent sale of this natural gas
by the same company constituted interstate commerce, according to the opinion
of the Court, as distinguished from the retailing by local companies of natural
gas brought from another state by a separate corporation, which had previously
been held not a branch of interstate commerce in Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 (1919).

But while conceding that the business constituted

interstate commerce, the Court holds it so far local in character as to justify
State regulation in the absence of action by Congress.
State legislation prohibitive of the transportation of natural gas has been
held invalid as interfering with interstate commerce in a matter of national
concern; West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 -U. S. 229 (1911); Manufacturers'
Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Company, 155 Ind. 545, 53 L. R. A.
134 (i9oo); as has also the prohibition of interstate commerce in other legitimate
articles, i. e., prohibition of importation and sale of beer in original packages,
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. ioo (1889); prohibition of oleomargarine, SchollenSo also State regulation of the
berger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. I (897).
price to be charged for interstate transportation service would ordinarily be
unconstitutional for the same reasons; Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois,
i8 U. S. 557 (1886); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154
U. S. 204 (1893). However, in Port Richmond Ferry Co. v. Freeholders, 234
U. S. 317 (1917), the Court sustained State regulation of interstate ferry charges
which had not been regulated by Congress.
The decision in the Pennsylvania Gas Company case, that regulation
of the local sale price of gas piped from another state is of interstate commerce
of local character not requiring uniform regulation and therefore subject to
State legislation when Congress has not acted, is in accord with the accepted
interpretation of the Commerce clause, even though such price regulation must
necessarily affect the interstate transportation of the gas.
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DIVIDENDS

UNDER THE

IN-

COME TAx.-The Standard Oil Company of California, having fifty million

dollars of outstanding capital stock, with an authorized capitalization of one
hundred million dollars, and with its books showing some forty-five million
dollars of undivided profits, declared a fifty per cent. stock dividend upon the
cash value of which the plaintiff was assessed a tax under the Federal Income
Tax Act of September 8, 1916. The Act provided, Part I, Sec. 2, (a): "
shall be held to mean any distribution made . . . by
dividends . .
a corporation out of its earnings or profits . . . whether in cash or in stock
of the corporation, which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the
amount of its cash value." The plaintiff, having paid the tax under protest,
sued the defendant collector to recover the tax alleging that stock dividends
are not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution and that therefore the assessment was illegal by reason of its violating
Art. I, Sec. 2 and Art. I, Sec. 9 of the Constitution of the United States.
Held: (Brandeis, Holmes and Day, J. J., dissenting): The assessment is
invalid, as a stock dividend is only a bookkeeping rearrangement of the evidences of ownership in a fixed proportional share of the entire assets of the corporation. Only when there is a transfer of part of the corporate assets to a
stockholder does he realize a profit or gain, which becomes his separate property
and constitutes income derived from capital that he or his predecessor has invested, Eisner v. Macomber, 4o Sup. Ct. 189 (1920).
Mr. Justice Pitney in delivering the opinion of the court further stated
that, in his view, any attempt to tax stock dividends as a tax upon the stockholder's share of the undivided profits of a corporation would be valid only as
a direct tax on property that would require apportionment among the States
because, under the decision of Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., x58 U. S.
6oi (1895), the profits or proceeds derived from realty or personalty are deemed
direct taxes on property; and that this decision is not affected by the Sixteenth
Amendment which applies only to income "and what is called the stockholder's
share of the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not income. As
we have pointed out, a stockholder has no individual share in accumulated
profits, nor in any particular part of the assets of the corporation, prior to dividend declared."
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion, takes the opposite view
on this point and deems that under the Sixteenth Amendment the Congress
has the power to disregard the corporate fiction as regards taxation in such a
situation by taxing as income the stockholder's pro rata share of the undivided
profits. A fortiori it has the power to tax such pro rata share as has been actually earned and declared in the form of a stock dividend, Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. I, 17 (U. S. 1870).
Mr. Justice Brandeis also comes to a conclusion opposed to that of the
majority in that he finds that a stock dividend has no essential or substantial
difference in character from the numerous similar forms of distribution of corporate assets used in business today, all of which have been uniformly held
to be income in the taxable meaning and, in accord with Mr. Justice Holmes,
finds that the word income used in the Sixteenth Amendment was intended
to include all the distribution methods in use and that it certainly included
a standard form of distribution such as the stock dividend.

RECENT CASES
It should be noted that the argument of the court that stock dividends
can only be taxed as direct taxes on property is based on decisions made prior
to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, and on the conclusion arrived
at earlier in the opinion that they are capital and not income in regard to the
tax in issue. It cannot therefore be said that the opinion is authority on the
point, particularly as the sole decision on the point, Collector v. Hubbard, supra,
was overruled by Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., supra, only in so far
as it upheld a tax on income, the objection to which has apparently been removed by the Sixteenth Amendment. It will be of interest to observe whether
Congress will follow the suggestion of Mr. Justice Brandeis as to the mode by
which it can lawfully impose a tax on stock dividends.
There seems to be only one flat decision holding that stock dividends
are taxable as income when complicated by Constitutional limitations and
even that case is under a State Constitution where no prohibition against direct
taxation exists, Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N. E. 9o4
(1917). England, in the absence of such limitations, has held stock dividends
taxable as income, Swan Brewing Co. v. The King, (1914) A. C. 231. In Earps
Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857), they were deemed income, in part, as between life
tenant and remainderman. A dividend paid in the stock of another corporation has been held to be taxable income. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347
(1918). Stock dividends paid in the stock of the corporation itself where the
corporation has received its own stock in payment of a debt, Green v. Bissell,
79 Conn. 547, 65 Atl. io56 (1907); or by purchase out of its undivided profits,
Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542 (1869), have been held income. Where the
capital of a corporation is taxed upon a valuation derived from the earning
capacity it is proper to include as income in this sense the par value of any stock
dividends declared. People v. Glynn, 13o N. Y. App. Div. 332, 114 N. Y. S.
46o (19o9), affirmed in 198 N. Y. 6o5, 92 N. E. 1097 (1910).
DAMAGES-RATE OF EXCHANGE.-The plaintiffs, an American firm, sued

the deiendants, an English Co., for failure to receive certain quantities of condensed milk in accordance with a contract. One of the questions involved was
the amount of damages to be accorded in view of the falling rate of exchange
between the time of the breach and that of the trial. Held: That the rate of
exchange should be calculated as of the date ot the judgment. Kxrsch & Co.
v. Allen, Harding & Co., Ltd., 122 L. T. I59 (Eng. x919).
It is a universal principle that a judgment must be given in the currency
of the forum for the value of the foreign money to which the plaintiff is entitled,
and the only question is, at what time that value is to be determined. Pollack v. Colglazure, Sneed 2 (Ky. I8OI); Benners v. Clemmens, 58 Pa. 24 (1868).
In those cases in which actions have been brought on a contract to pay a certain sum of money in the currency of a foreign country, the courts generally
have held, that the amount recoverable should be computed according to the
rate of exchange prevailing at the time of trial or judgment, on the theory that
the plaintiff thus obtains a sum of money in the currency of the forum which
enables him to procure the exact amount to which he is entitled in the foreign
currency. Marburg v. Marburg, 26 Md. 8 (1866); Comstock v. Smith, 20
Mich. 338 (1870); Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629 (1870). This rule is well
illustrated in Robinson v. Hall, 28 How. Pr. 342 (N. Y. 1864), where the plaintiff
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had loaned the defendant six pounds sterling in England to be repaid on arrival
in New York City. The testimony showed that this amount was worth seventyeight dollars on or about the day when the debt was payable, and sixty-seven
dollars on the day of the trial. It was held that the latter sum was the true
measure of damages. Likewise in a suit on a promissory note payable in certain
railroad stock, the damages were given in the amount of the value of that railroad stock at the time of the judgment. Parks v. Marshall, io Ind. 20 (1857).
The same rule is followed in those cases where the suit is on a contract
other than for the payment of money, as shown in Nickerson v. Soesman, 98
Mass. 364 (1865). In that case, the Court said, "The just rule is, that where
a party has suffered a loss or injury through the fault of another, he should be
allowed such a sum in the currency of the place where suit is brought, as most
nearly approximates that which he would be entitled to recover in the country
where the damage was sustained." And on theory it would seem that the
principal case is correctly decided, for if one of the parties to an agreement
fails to keep his contract, then in whatever country the creditor sues him,
the law of that country ought to give him just as much as he would have had
if the contract had been performed. In Cockerell v. Barber, 16 Vesey 46r
(Eng. 18io) the current value of the rupee at the time when the legacy should
have been paid, governed the payment in English pounds sterling.
It is of interest to note that the Supreme Court of the United States in
Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, 40 Sup. Ct. 16o (192o) decided that, in the absence
of any evidence whatsoever as to depreciation in value ot the German mark at
the time of payment, the value of the mark should be taken at par.
DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION-WARRANTY AND QUITCLAIM DEEDS.-X,

through

whom the plaintiff claimed, owned a part of the land in question in fee. She
executed a deed to the defendant which recited, "I bargain, sell and convey
whatever interest I have in the said land; it being my sole property, and which
I convey as feme sole. I warrant to defend the title to the land to the defendant
against the lawful claims of all persons whatsoever." Later X inherited another portion of the land in question. The defendant claimed the land which
X had inherited by the deed recited. Held: This was a warranty deed, and the
plaintiff is now estopped from asserting the after-acquired title of X. (One
justice dissenting) Jackson v. Lady, 216 S. W. 505 (Ark. 1919).
As a general rule a conveyance of all right, title and interest in land, unless a contrary intention appears, passes only such title as the grantor has, and
the grantee does not acquire any rights which subsequently accrue to the grantor.
r8 C. J. 316, and cases there cited. But whether a deed is a quitclaim or more
depends on all the circumstances showing the purpose of the instrument. Tiffany, Real Property 862 and cases there cited; 18 C. J. supra.
In Reynolds v. Shaver, 59 Ark. 299, 27 S. W. 78 (1894) it was held that
a deed which recited a "sale of all right, title and interest" and contained a
warranty "to defend the land to the grantee" was only a quitclaim. And in
Manson v. Peaks, io3 Me. 430, 27 N. W. 78 (i908) the words, "land being part
of that bought by me from the town F" were construed to be mere words of
description, and not a covenant of title. In the principal case, however, a
conveyance of the grantor's interest, coupled with a warranty to defend it to

RECENT CASES
the grantee as in Shaver v. Reynolds, supra; and a descriptive clause of sole
ownership as a feme sole, was regarded by the court as ambiguous and extrinsic
evidence was permitted to prove this a warranty deed. Evidently the court
is shifting somewhat from its position in Shaver v. Reynolds, supra, in order
to give effect to the actual intent of the parties.
EviDENcE-Booxs

OF

AccOUNT-CARD SYSTEMS.-A physician noted

his charges to patients in a small book from which his sister daily transferred
them to a card index system. In an action to recover from a decedent's estate
for professional services, Held: Loose card systems are not admissible in evidence.
Daniels's Estate, 77 Leg. Int. 134 (Pa. i919).
The question as to whether book accounts are admissible to prove physician's charges has never been decided by an appellate court in Pennsylvania.
Many courts of first instance have held such evidence is admissible. Moffat's
Estate, i W. N. C. 518 (Pa. 1875); Haines's Estate, io Pa. Dist. Rep. 677 (19or);
Kready's Estate, 21 Lanc. Law Rev. 13 (Pa. 1902); but dicta in other cases
have indicated that such evidence would not be admissible. Foreman's Estate,
7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 2r4 (1898); Hall v. Smitheran, 26 Pa. Dist. Rep. 203 (1917).
Other jurisdictions have received physicians' book accounts as evidence. Toomer
v. Gadsdie, 4 Strob. I93 (S. C. 185o); and dicta in Temple v. Magruder, 36
Col. 390. 85 Pac. 832 (i9o6); Colburn v. Parrett,

27

Cal. App. 541, 15o Pac. 786

(1915).
A physician's call book is not considered as a book of original entry.

Es-

tate of Finch, 49 P. L. J. 179 (Pa. i9II); Estate of Claney, 51 P. L. f. 139 (Pa.

i913); nor is a printed diary with figures and symbols marked down in the blanks.
Germans's Estate, 14 V. N. C. 193 (Pa. 1883). But entries in a book made
from memoranda furnished by a person other than the one who keeps the books
is considered as a book of original entry. Hoover v. Gehr, 62 Pa. 136 (1869);
Philadelphia v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., 38 Pa. Sup. Ct. 286 (I909); provided
the entry be transferred from the memoranda not later than the succeeding
day. Forsythe v. Norcross, 5 Watts 432 (Pa. 1836).
Unconnected scraps of paper containing accounts of sales Irregularly
kept are not admissible, Thompson v. McKelvey, 13 S.& R. 126 (Pa. 1825);
nor is a book admissible which contains no charges except those against the
decedent. In re Fulton's Estate, 178 Pa. 78 (1896). But where it can be
seen that the sheets are part of a book retained in compact form they have been
held admissible. Pittfield's Estate, 64 P. L. J. 135 (Pa. i915). And even
original sales slips filed systematically are competent as evidence. Braddock
Lumber Co. v. Hecht, 66 P. L. J. 668 (Pa. I916). Furthermore it is generally
held in other jurisdictions that loose leaf ledger systems are admissible as books
of original entry. United Grocery Co. v. Dannelly & Son, 93 S. C. 580, 177
S. E. 7o6 (1912); Armstrong Clothing Co. v. Boggs, 9o Neb. 499, 133 N. W.
1122 (1912); L. R. A. 1916 B 634 note.
A card system has also been held admissible in evidence. Haley & Lang Co. v. Vecchio, 36 S.D. 64, 133 N. W.
898 (1915).

The court in the principal case based its decision on in re Fulton's Estate
supra which held that entries in a book in which no other accounts appeared
were not admissible since it was not an account "kept in the regular routine of
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business." However, the principal case appears to differ materially from this
case, for although the accounts of only one person appear on each card, yet
the cards are part of a record systematically kept in a method generally recognized in the commercial world. As has been said by one court: "The manner
of keeping the accounts is the important consideration . . . to hold that
they must be bound in book form is giving importance to form rather than
substance." Graham v. Worth, 162 Ia. 383, 141 N. W. 428 (1913).
JURY-WOMEN NOT QUALIFIED BY SUFFRAGE AMENDMENT.-In application for mandamus to direct the commissioner of jurors to include women in
the jury list, the petitioner claimed that the requirement that jurors be, inter
alia, "male citizens" was eliminated by adoption of an amendment to the state
constitution by which the franchise was extended to all citizens, the qualification of "male" being dropped. Held. Jury service, whether a right or an obligation, is not incidental to the right to vote and the prayer of the petition was
therefore denied. In re Grilli, 179 N. Y. S. 795 (i919).
The common law jury consisted of twelve "free and lawful men, liberos et
legales homines," 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 352; and women were excluded
from jury service because of their sex, Id. 362. The only exception to this
was when the pregnancy of a woman was a material fact, as "when a widow
feigns herself with child, in order to exclude the next heir, and a supposititious
birth is suspected to be intended," or when the pregnancy of the female prisoner
was claimed in a plea in arrest of execution, when a jury of twelve matrons
was impaneled to determine the truth of such claim, 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 362, and 4 Id. 395. See also Reg. v. Wycherley, 8 C. & P. 262 (Eng.
1838); State v. Arden, I Bay 487 (S. C. 1795); Holeman v. State, 13 Ark. o5
(1852); 9 Cent. L. J. 94, 48 Am. Law Rev. 280; 2 American State Trials, 196.
It is well settled that state laws fixing qualifications for jurors other than
those fixed by the common law do not deny the right ot trial by jury, where such
right is preserved by the constitution, in re Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986
(1918); 24 Cyc. 186, I96; and it is competent for the state to make electors
eligible for jury service regardless of citizenship, People v. Collins, 166 Mich. 4,
13x N. W. 78 (191i); and likewise may qualify citizens who are not entitled to
vote, State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895 (1894). When the state
law restricts selection of jurors to "electors" it is at least arguable that extension
of the franchise to any new class of the community, as women, should ipso facto
make its members eligible for jury service, and there is authority for such a
view, Rosencrantz v. Ter. of Washington, 2 Wash. Ter. 267, 5 Pac. 305 (1884);
Hayes v. Ter. of Washington, 2 Wash. Ter. 286, 5 Pac. 927 (1884), (these cases
were overruled in Harland v. Ter. of Washington, 3 Wash. Ter. 131, 13 Pac.
453 (1887) but mainly on the ground that the act extending the franchise to
women was unconstitutional). Where, however, as in the principal case, the
jury is to be composed of "male citizens," "male electors," "men," etc., such
a result is not to be justified. McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293
(1892); People v. Lensen, 34 Cal. App. 336 (917).
But see Rose v. Sullivan,
r85 Pac. 562 (Mont. i919) where it was held that a constitutional amendment
eliminating the word "male" from the constitutional qualification of voters,
abolished every political distinction based upon the consideration of sex, and
made women eligible for an office to be filled by "some male person."

RECENT CASES
But even in those states where it is admitted that women are qualified to
serve on juries it is not unusual to exempt them from that duty solely because
of their sex, e. g., Kansas, General Statutes of Kansas, 1915, sec. 5812; Nevada,.
Statutes of Nevada, I915, Ch. 66, p. 84; Utah, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917,
sec. 3599; Washington, 3 Rem. & Bal. Annotated Codes and Statutes of Washington, 1913, Ch. 57, P. 314.

LIFE INSURANcE-ExEMPTION FROM LIABILITY-INTERPRETATION OF
WAR CLAUSE.-A life insurance policy of the defendant company exempted
it from liability if the insured met "death while engaged in military or naval
service in time of war, or in consequence of such service." The insured who,
was in the military service of the United States died from influenza while en
route between military camps in the United States. Held. The insured's administrator could recover on the policy as the defendant was exempt only when
death was caused by activities of an essentially military nature. Benham v.
American Central Life Ins. Co. (No. 5), 217 S. W. 462 (Ark. 1920).
The rule that exemption provisions are strictly construed against theinsurer is firmly established. Death by an overdose of morphine taken to.
relieve pain was adjudged not to be a death "caused or superinduced by the
use of narcotics or opiates." Renn v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias,
83 Mo. App. 442 (1900). Pneumonia was not considered a "pulmonary" disease under an exemption provision protecting the insurer when death resulted
from any "pulmonary disease." Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
I Pa. Super. Ct. 572 (1896).
In recent reports there have been several cases similar to the principat
case and yet none so favorable to the beneficiary of the policy. Recovery was
had upon a policy exempting the company from death "as a result of such (military) service," when the insured died from an accidental gunshot wound received in a military camp in the United States. Malone v. State Life Ins. Co.,
213 S. W. 877 (Mo. 1919). In a case in which death was caused by a fall from
a motorcycle one hundred miles behind "the front" in France, the phrases.
in the "war clause," "as a result, directly or indirectly, of engaging in such.
(military) work" prevented the exemption from applying. Kelly v. Fidelity
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Phila., 169 Wis. 274, 172 N. W. 152 (I919). The same
court that decided the principal case in Miller v. Ill. Banker's Life Assn., 212
S. W. 3io (Ark. i919) on account of the "war clause" containing the word&
"while in the service" exempted the insurer from liability when death resulted
from pneumonia in a camp in the United States. Thus, with substantially
the same facts, before the same court, the phrase, "while in military or naval
service" was interpreted as referring to the period of service, and "while engagedin military or naval service" was interpreted as indicating acts of a military
nature in pursuance of extra hazardous duty. It is a narrow line of differentiation.
MINES AND MINING-SURFACE SUPPORT-UPPER AND LOWER SEAMS OF
CoAL.--The owner of two seams of coal leased the lower without any express

reservation of the right to support. While the lessee was removing pillars in
the lower seam, thereby causing serious injury to operations in the upper seam,.
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the owner sold the upper seam, subject to the rights of the lessee of the lower.
The conveyance recited that pillars were being removed below and provided
that the purchaser should not be required to pay royalty for any coal lost as a
result thereof. Held: (In affirming a decree restraining the removal of the
pillars): The right to support was a proprietary right in the superincumbent
mine and had not ben waived. Lennox Coal Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal
Co., 265 Pa. 572 (1920).
The universal rule is that when the surface and the minerals below are
divided into two separate estates, the owner of the surface has the right to support in the absence of an express or necessarily implied waiver thereof. Humphries v. Brogden, r2 Q. B. 739 (Eng. r850); Marquette Cement Mining Co. -v.
Ogelsby Coal Co., I3 Fed. 107 (1918). The right attaches to the surface
whether it be the estate granted or the estate reserved. Stonegap Colliery Co.
v. Hamilton, irg Va. 271, 89 S. E. 305 (1916). In many of the cases the right
is spoken of as an easement appurtenant to the estate, Robertson v. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566, 33 Att. 7o6 (1896); but it is perhaps more
correctly considered an absolute proprietary right, Youghiogheny River Coal
Co. v. Allegheny National Bank, 211 Pa. 319, 6o Atl. 924 (1905); and a falling
in of the surface due to removing the minerals is actionable regardless of the
degree of care or skill with which they are removed. Berkey v. Berwind-White
Coal Co., 229 Pa. 417, 78 Atl. 0o4 (r91).'
By the majority rule a lease or sale of all the underlying minerals does
not constitute a waiver of the right to support. (See the cases cited supra.)
In West Virginia the opposite rule prevails, Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59
W. Va. 48o, 53 S. E. 24 (19o5). In this case a most thorough exposition of the
subject is to be found in the exhaustive dissenting and concurring opinions;
and the case influenced though it did not exactly control the decision of the
Federal Court in Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 179 Fed. x91 (i9io.)

In the principal case the rule in regard to surface right of support is applied
to the case of a superincumbent mine. In Yandes v. Wright, 66 Md. 319 (1879),
in which the right of an upper mine to support from a lower was admitted, it
was said, "Surface includes whatever earth, soil, or land lies above and superincumbent on the mine." There seems to be no reason why a mine owner
should not be protected from the operations below to the same extent as is a
surface owner; and it is good public policy so to protect him, especially in view
of the possibility of a cave-in rendering the upper mine unworkable.
NEGLIGENCE OF MANUFACTURER-LIABILITY TO SUBVENDEE-REVERSAL

OF ERROR-STARE DEcisIs.-Plaintiff bought from a dealer a touring car which
was negligently manufactured by the defendant company with a defective wheel,
but which it put upon the market without knowledge of such a defect. The
plaintiff sued the company for injuries resulting from the collapse of the wheel.
Upon a former writ of error in the same case between the same parties the court
decided that because there was no contractual privity between the parties
the defendant company was not liable. Held: The former decision was so
clearly erroneous and contrary to the interests of society as to justify its reversal
notwithstanding the rule of stare decisis. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.,
261 Fed. 878 (i919); reversing

221

Fed. 8oi (1915).

RECENT CASES
It is the majority rule that a manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused
by defects in the negligent manner of construction, manufacture or sale of an
article unless he is in contractual privity with the injured person. Bragdon v.
Perkins-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. io9 (1898); Ford Motor Co. v. Livesay, x6o
Pac. 9o (Okl. 1916); Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 122 N. E. I (Ind. 1919).
There are several universal exceptions. The manufacturer is liable when he
knows of the defect and conceals it from his vendee, for this is positive misfeasance; Schubert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W. 1103 (1892); but he
discharges his duty of care when he makes known the defect to his vendee.
Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351 (1870). If the article is imminently and inherently dangerous, and one which "preserves, destroys or affects human life,"
an affirmative duty of care is placed upon the manufacturer not to injure by
his negligence any person using such article for its ordinary purposes. Huset v.
Case Threshing Machine Co., 12o Tex. 805 (19o3). This exception is usually,
but perhaps arbitrarily, limited to explosives, firearms, drugs and foodstuffs.
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Elkins v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493 (1875).
Huset v. Threshing Machine Co., supra, a leading case upon this subject,
assigns three reasons for the majority rule; first, that injury to anyone other
than the immediate vendee cannot ordinarily be anticipated; second, that the
immediate vendee is an independent responsible human agency who intervenes
between the vendor and the person injured and "insulates" one from the other;
third, that "a wise and conservative public policy" necessitates a limitation
upon the manufacturer's liability. The unsoundness of the reasoning in this
case, which is widely followed, has been ably demonstrated. Professor Bohlen's
Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 Am. Law Reg. 337 (19o5). And
in the case of an injury to a subvendee the rule is especially harsh and the reasons
stated above peculiarly inapplicable. It is illogical to say that injury to the
ultimate purchaser is not the natural and probable consequence of the manufacturer's negligence. Certainly injury to the immediate vendee, the dealer
who acquires the article to sell, not to use, is quite improbable. In fact, of all
persons, injury to the ultimate purchaser is most probable. MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 11 N. E. io5o (i9i6). The intermediate
act of sale on the part of the dealer, not being wrongful, cannot be said to insulate the manufacturer's act of negligence. Professor Bohlen's article, supra,
p. 346. The net result is that although injury to the ultimate purchaser was
more probable than to anyone else, he is remediless, for he cannot recover against
the dealer in the absence of a warranty; Longmeid v. Holiday, 6 Exch. 764
(Eng. 1851); and the manufacturer is in actual practice answerable to no one for
careless manufacturing. Such a situation, so favorable to the manufacturer
and so harsh upon the ultimate purchaser, is hardly necessitated by a wise public
policy.
The principal case follows- the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., supra, and adheres to a rule laid down in New York which is both reasonable and workable. It extends the rule as to articles imminently dangerous,
to those articles which are in themselves usually safe, but which if negligently
manufactured become imminently dangerous. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 47o
(1882); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra. In other jurisdictions the
same result has been obtained by classing articles as imminently dangerous
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because they actually turn out to be so in the particular instance; Pillars v.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (I918); Grant v. Bottling Co..
176 N. C. 256, 97 S. E. 27 (i918); Herman v. Markham Air Rifle Co., 258 Fed,
475 (1918), commented upon in 68 U. of P. Law Rev. 191; or by artificially
charging the manufacturer with knowledge of the defect, because he ought to
have discovered a defect which made the article imminently dangerous. Olds
Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, I4oS. W. 1047 (1911); Armstrong Packing
Co. v. Clem, 151 S. W. 576 (Tex. 1912).
The court's reversal of its former decision on the same case between the
same parties is contrary to the majority rule of stare decisis, which holds that such
a decision is the law of that particular case and not subject to reversal. Bolton
v. Hay, 168 Pa. 418, 31 Atl. 1097 (1895); Thomson v. Maxwell Land Grant
Co., 168 U. S. 451 (1897). The more liberal view, however, permits such a
reversal in the exceptional case where the court is convinced that its first decision
was clear error and that adherence to it would be prejudicial to the interests of
society. Cluff v. Day, 141 N. Y. 58o, 36 N. E. 182 (1894); Penna. Co. v. Platt,
47 Ohio 366, 25 N. E. 1028 (189o). In the principal case such a reversal is indicative of the extent of the reaction of the court to the injustice and unreasonableness of the majority rule as to the liability of the manufacturer to the subvendee.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-PARTIES WHO MAY ENFoRcE.-A deed to a
part of a large building property contained a covenant by the grantee that he
and all persons deriving title under him would not, without the written consent
of the grantors, "their heirs and assigns or the persons deriving title under them"
carry on any trade except a coal business, and would not permit anything which
might be a nuisance, annoyance, or disturbance to the grantors or persons deriving title under them. There were similar covenants in conveyances to other
grantees. Held: The benefit of the covenant was not annexed to the land
retained by the grantors nor to any part thereof, but passed by operation of
law to their executors. Ives v. Brown [1919] 2 Ch. 314.
Where a part of a piece of land is conveyed subject to a "restrictive covenant not running with the land in law" such covenant is either personal to the
grantor, Weber v. Landrigan, 215 Mass. 221, 102 N. E. 46o (I913), or for the
benefit of the grantor's land or a particular part thereof, Bowen v. Smith, 76
N. J. Eq. 456, 74 Atl. 675 (I9o9). If intended for the benefit of the land retained
by the grantor or a part thereof, a subsequent grantee of such part can enforce
the covenant by injunction, though there had been no assignment of the benefit
to him and though he may not have known of the covenant. See Pomeroy's
Eq. Jur. 4th Ed. §§r693, I696, and cases cited.
On the wording of the covenant a fine distinction is drawn between the
principal case and the case of Rogers v. Hosegood, [1900] 2 Ch. 388, in which a
covenant, to enure to the benefit of the grantors, "their heirs and assigns and
others claiming under them to all or any of their lands adjoining or near the said
premises," was held to run with the land. And the principal case follows Renals
v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. Div. 125 (1876) in which the covenant was with the grantors,
"'their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns," containing no words which
would indicate that it was for the protection of adjoining land.

RECENT CASES
Both in this country and in England the existence of a general scheme
for improvement, under which similar restrictions are imposed on the various
grantees, indicates that the benefit of the restrictions was intended to be annexed
to the land. Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. 341 (1863); Nottingham Brick &
Tile Co. v. Butler, L. R. I6 Q. B. D. 778 (1886). Where there is no such general
scheme, the modern English rule seems to be that a restrictive covenant is personal to the covenantee, unless shown to be otherwise by the deed. Pomeroy's
Eq. Jur. 4th Ed. §1696, note 17, quoting from Cozen-Hardy, M. R. in Reid v.
Bickerstaff [1907] 2 Ch. 305, 320.

In the United States a broader rule prevails

and outside circumstances may show the intention, Ball v. Milliken, 31 R. 1.
36, 76 Atl. 789 (I9io), where property was restricted to the use of a blacksmith
shop, by a covenant with the "grantor, his heirs, executors, and a signs," and
it was held that the benefit ran with the land.
SALES-STRIKE CLAUSE-CAUSE BEYOND PARTIES CONTROL MUST BE

PROxIMATE.-Defendant, a coal broker, contracted to supply plaintiff with definite amounts of coal from a certain mine at specified times. This contract
was subject to strikes, car shortages and other causes beyond the control of the
parties. Defendant to fulfill its contract with plaintiff contracted with the mine
owners for the coal to be supplied on the dates plaintiff's contract became operative. Defendant broke the contract and sought to avoid liability by reason of
strikes and car shortage at the mines from which the coal was to be procured.
By reason of the strike the output of the mines was materially reduced. Held:
The strike and car shortage was not the proximate cause of defendant's failure
to deliver since defendant's failure to protect himself by adequate contracts
or by purchase from the persons controlling the output was an intervening
cause. DeGrasse Paper Co. v. Northern New York Coal Co., 179 N. Y. S. 788
(1919).

The general rule in these cases is that performance of the contract, usually
in respect to delivery, may be excused because of strikes or other causes beyond
the control of the parties, if a provision to that effect is expressed in the contract.
Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256 (1902); City
of Covington v. Kanawha Coal & Coke Co., 121 Ky. 681, 89 S. W. 1126 (I9O5).

To avoid liability for failure to perform, the cause must be shown by the party
in default to come clearly within the provision of the contract. Consolidated
Coal Co. of St. Louis v. The Block and Hartman Smelting Co., 36 I1. App. 38
(I89O); Widman et al. v. Straukamp et al., 94 N. Y. S. 18 (19o5).
In determining whether the cause for failure to deliver comes within the
provision some courts have held that the word "strikes" includes any strike
having a legitimate tendency to prevent the execution of the contract. This
is the rule laid down by the court in Davis v. Columbia Coal Mining Co., 170
Mass. 391, 49 N. E. 629 (z898), when the railroad company seized coal shipped
by the defendant to the plaintiff at a time when there was a general strike on
in the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania. This view, however, seems to be
a too liberal interpretation of the provision. The better view is that the strike
or other cause must be the proximate cause of the failure to perform and so far
beyond the control of the party in default as to make the performance impossible.
W. K. Niver Coal Co. v. Cheronea S. S. Co., 142 Fed. 492 (19o5); Smokeless
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Fuel Co. v. Seaton & Sons, io5 Va. r70, 52 S. E. 829 (z9o6). Under this view
the word "strikes" includes strikes at the seller's plants and general strikes if
no independent causes intervene to cause failure of performance, Hesser-MdtonRenahan Coal Co. v. LaCrosse Coal Co., 114 Wis. 654 (902).
When the seller
does not own the plant the strike must be beyond the control of the operators
and shipments of the product or the output of the plant must be materially cut
down to enable the party in default to excuse his failure within the provision.
Smokeless Fuel Co. v. Seaton & Sons, supra; Cottrell v. Smokeless Fuel Co.,
148 Fed. 594 (19o6). While it is usual to expressly provide for shortage of cars
in the provision, in the absence of an express stipulation to this effect, "other
cause beyond the control of the parties" has been interpreted to cover car shortages which made shipments of the product an impossibility. Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Mexico Fire Brick Co., 66 Mo. App. 296 (x896); Hatfield v. Thomas
Iron Co., 2o8 Pa. 478 (1904).
In view of the character of the defendant's business in the principal case
it is difficult to see how it could more adequately protect itself than by making
the kind of contracts it did. The court seems to have gone rather far in holding
that the strike and car shortage, which not only cut down the productionofthe
mine but hindered the shipments of the coal, was not the proximate cause of
the defendant's failure to perform.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION IN PENNSYLVANIA-REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.-The testator disposed of real and personal property in the following manner: after giving a life interest to his wife he directed his executors to divide his
estate equally between his two sons and three daughters, the sons to receive their
share and the daughters to receive the interest of their share during their lives,
and if any of them should die without issue, their share to go to the remainder
of the children above named then living, or their issue, if any, and if not any,
then over. One son and one daughter predeceased their mother without leaving
issue. On the death of the mother, the son and the two surviving daughters
each claimed to be entitled absolutely to one-third of the entire fund. Held:
The son took an absolute interest in one-third of the proceeds of both the real
and personal property; and the daughters each took an absolute interest in
one-third of the proceeds of the real estate and a life interest in one-third of
the proceeds of the personal estate. Birely's Estate, 0. C., Phila. Co., October
Term, i919, No. 123. (Unreported.)
It was conceded in the principal case that the son took an absolute interest
in both the real and personal estate. The sole question that was presented to
the court was whether, in construing the gifts to the daughters, the circumstance of the testator having dealt with both classes of property in the same
words necessarily resulted in the construction that it was intended that the daughters should take the same interests in the personal property that they took in
the real estate.
It is well settled that if the devise of the realty be considered separately
the devisees would take an absolute interest. Heffner v. Knepper, 6 Watts 18
(Pa. 1837); Williams on Real Property 215, n. I (6th Am. Ed.). It is equally
well settled that if the bequests of the personalty are construed without reference
to the devise of the real estate the daughters are entitled to life interests only.
Crawford's Estate, 17 Pa. Sup. Ct. 170 (1901).

RECENT CA SES
The distinction in the rules applicable to real and personal property is
founded in the fundamental difference in the legal incidents of their subject
matters. In re Wynch's Trusts, 17 Jur. 588, 593 (Efig. 1853); s. c. on appeal,
Ex Parte Wynch, 5 D. M. & G. x88, 214, 219-20, 225-6 (Eng. 1854). Accordingly, where both personal and real property are disposed of by the same words
in the same will it is also a recognized rule of construction that the principles
applicable to each class may be respectively applied to the property in that class.
Forth v. Chapman, I P. Wins. 663 (Eng. 1720); Jackson v. Calvert, I J. & H.
230 (Eng. i86o).
In Pennsylvania, however, the law in such cases is by no means clear.
The rule of Forth v. Chapman was said, by Duncan, J., in Train v. Fisher, 15
S. & R. 145, 148 (Pa. 1826), to have been "acknowledged, though not perhaps
-actually decided in our own courts," and it has been repeatedly approved of in
similar language. Clark v. Baker, 3 S. & R. 47o,478 (Pa. 1817); Myers's Appeal,
49 Pa. 111, 114 (1865); Heiss's Estate, I Pa. C. C. 397 (1886). In Drennan's
Appeal, 118 Pa. 176 (1888), it was held that an absolute interest in the personal
property and a life interest in the real property were created by the same words.
See also National Live Stock Bank v. Hartman, 8 Pa. Sup. Ct. 170 (1898).
The decision was qualified, however, by the statement that where real and personal property are thus intermingled, a presumption arises that it was intended
to give the same interest in the personalty as was given in the realty, but that
this is merely a presumption which is rebutted when a contrary intent can be
gathered from the whole will. On the other hand, in Robinson's Estate, 149
Pa. 418 (1892), the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, an auditor's report in
which it was ruled that "the testator having disposed of his personal property
along with his real estate without distinction, the whole will be treated agreeably
to the rules governing the disposal and distribution of real estate. Jarman
on Wills, vol. 3, page 297; Mickley's Appeal, 92 Pa. 514; 141 Pa. 350." The
authorities cited do not support the principle enunciated, and there is no further
discussion of the matter either in the report, arguments of counsel,or the opinion
of the court. The same rule is stated by way of dictum in Edwards's Estate,
227 Pa. 299 (1910). While Robinson's Estate, supra, would seem to be the
governing case in Pennsylvania on this subject at the present time, reason and
the weight of modern authority are both opposed to it, and it remains to be
seen whether a rule of such far-reaching consequences will be engrafted on our
law without a more thorough consideration and argument of the precise point
raised in the principal case.

